Cozen Currents: Red and Blue are Relative

“As Heraclitus famously said, ‘The only constant in life is change.’ From the looks of the 2026 midterms, the electoral battleground of the United States appears to fit squarely within this aphorism.” — Howard Schweitzer, CEO, Cozen O’Connor Public Strategies

The Cozen Lens

• Races within the margin of error in several traditionally uncompetitive states raise the question of whether the 2026 midterm elections will expand the Senate and presidential battlegrounds going forward or simply reflect an unusual environment.
• Some amount of turnover during the last two years of a president’s second term is expected and there is likely to be more churn among President Trump’s appointees after the midterms.
• The midterm results will shape not just who controls Congress next year, but how and when FY27 appropriations get done.

Subscribe to Cozen Currents

The New Swing States

A Shifting Map. Polling averages and race ratings place several reliably GOP-leaning states and at least one reliably Democratic state in competitive territory, signaling a potential shift in the battleground.

• After coming up short in 2018, Democrats hope state Representative James Talarico will be the first Democrat to win a statewide election in Texas since 1994. Talarico narrowly leads GOP nominee and State Attorney General Ken Paxton in polling averages, and forecasters have steadily shifted the race to a toss-up throughout the year. Talarico is bolstered by Texas’s changing demographics, with a growing Hispanic population driving much of his polling gains. Across the country, former Representative Mary Peltola (D-AK) narrowly leads the polling averages in her race against Senator Dan Sullivan (R-AK), positioning her to potentially win statewide for the second time this decade. Her campaign comes as Democrats seek to make gains among rural and Native populations in Alaska.
• While they may not benefit from the same demographic shifts, Democratic candidates are also surprisingly competitive in a handful of Midwest states, reviving the party’s hopes of returning previously competitive states to the forefront of the battleground. Chief among those is Iowa, a state former President Barack Obama won twice before it swung to the right. Today, Democratic gubernatorial nominee Rob Sand leads polling averages while state Representative Josh Turek is within the margin of error in the Senate race. A few states away, the party hopes to win its first Kansas Senate race since 1932, potentially replicating the success Governor Laura Kelly achieved twice in recent years.
• Republicans, for their part, are competing in Minnesota, where they have not won a Senate race since 2002. Former broadcaster Michele Tafoya is outrunning a generic Republican in her polling against Lieutenant Governor Peggy Flanagan, and election handicappers recently shifted their rating toward the GOP. Out east, former Senator John Sununu (R-NH), while trailing, is running a competitive Senate race against Representative Chris Pappas (D-NH), and Governor Kelly Ayotte (R-NH) is favored to win re-election.

The Implications for 2028 and Beyond. Regardless of the November outcome, the expanded map gives both parties a chance to test new approaches in states they’d previously written off.

• For Democrats, in particular, nominees like minister Adam Hamilton in Kansas serve as a potential blueprint for future competitiveness in red states. Hamilton is a Second Amendment supporter, holds more moderate views on abortion and immigration, and doesn’t support Medicare for all. Elsewhere, Democrats are testing a further step. In Idaho, Nebraska, and South Dakota, the party cleared the field for an independent. In Alaska, Democrats view independent Bill Hill as their best chance to defeat Republican Representative Nick Begich.
• Beyond a candidate roadmap, newfound competitiveness in formerly uncompetitive states can lead parties to invest in an expanded map. Both parties tend to concentrate their infrastructure in battleground states each cycle, which has historically improved participation. A newly contested state can also spur outside investment, as seen with Democratic groups in Texas and Georgia post-2018.

An Unusual Year. Even if both parties pull off a surprise victory in a previously uncompetitive state, the driving forces behind those victories may be specific to this electoral cycle.

• From a macro perspective, the 2026 midterm environment is among the most difficult the GOP has faced in two decades. Democrats lead the generic ballot by 9 to 10 points, and President Trump’s approval rating is near its lowest point across both terms. Those conditions alone put GOP candidates in states the president won by double digits in 2024 on the defensive, but that may not be the case come 2028 or 2030 as the national political environment changes.
• State-specific factors also matter, particularly in Minnesota. Some of the Senate race’s competitiveness can be attributed to candidate quality, but part of it also stems from the state’s welfare fraud scandal. The issue ended Governor Tim Walz’s (D) re-election bid and has been the main line of attack from Tafoya and Republicans against Flanagan, given her proximity to Walz. In Texas, too, polls show Talarico benefiting from several scandals that weigh on Paxton’s approval rating.

Trump’s Shrinking Orbit

Second-Term Turnover. Some personnel turnover during the last two years of a president’s second term is typical.

• Top White House jobs are intense and it’s natural for people to step back. By this point, a president’s political capital has largely been spent. Other campaigns and private-sector opportunities can be attractive. President Donald Trump isn’t a conventional president, however, and there may be even more churn than normal among his appointees after the midterms.
• The outcome of the race for Senate control is crucial. If Republicans maintain control of the Senate with a healthy majority, there won’t be as much urgency to replace officials in Senate-confirmed positions. If their margin narrows or they lose the majority outright, pressure will mount to swap out Cabinet members or other Senate-confirmed officials during the lame-duck session, before confirmation becomes much harder.
• Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth could potentially be an early departure. Representative Thomas Massie (R-KY) already introduced articles of impeachment against Hegseth just before the House went into recess last month and a Democratic House majority would be likely to impeach him. If the midterms go poorly for Republicans and Trump is looking for a scapegoat to blame for the Iran conflict, which has driven up gasoline prices and harmed Republicans politically, Hegseth could take the fall. A parallel would be former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who publicly stepped down the day after Election Day in November 2006 when Democrats retook control of both chambers of Congress amid voters’ frustrations over the Iraq War.

Trump’s Team. Trump’s embrace of keeping appointees as acting, giving officials multiple jobs, and leaning on a network of informal advisors will likely continue.

• In a departure from past presidents’ practice, Trump has a habit of keeping appointees in acting roles, which can ensure greater loyalty as they embark on what’s essentially an extended job interview to get a nod for the permanent role. Federal law limits who can serve as an acting head of an agency and how long they can serve, which could restrict his options. If Democrats take control of the Senate or whittle down the Republican majority to 50 or 51 seats, Trump may not be able to get certain nominations confirmed, which could require more acting appointments.
• In his second term, Trump has often placed trusted officials in multiple positions, a trend that could continue or increase in the second half of his term if more personnel leave and the president taps other advisors to take on their jobs in addition to their own. In particular, Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s many jobs have sparked internet memes. Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton, recently named to lead the Super Intelligence Force, appears to be a rising star in the administration. “He is hyper-competent and a problem-solver with good instincts, and that’s why he’s so valued,” a former White House official told Semafor.
• Trump has traditionally relied on an informal “kitchen cabinet” of advisors. During his first term, he leveraged a network of business leaders and personal advisors outside the federal government. In his second term, he has developed closer relationships with Silicon Valley executives and recruited some tech billionaires for his Council of Advisors on Science and Technology. Elon Musk notably began Trump’s term last year as leader of DOGE, broke with the president, and is now back in his orbit as a co-director of the Pentagon’s Project Meridian commission on the future of warfare. Specific job titles are not as significant as individuals’ personal relationships with Trump and he may lean more on his kitchen cabinet if he can’t get new nominees confirmed by the Senate.

FY27 Appropriations Outlook

The Lame Duck Funding Fight. Lawmakers return after the midterm elections with a December 11 funding deadline and likely shifting power dynamics that could push a deal into next year or cause a shutdown.

• When lawmakers return after the midterm elections, one of the items Congress will seek to complete is FY27 appropriations legislation, with the government currently funded under a continuing resolution through December 11. Leaders in both parties will likely want to pass these bills before the end of the year, but whether they can achieve that goal is less certain.
• The lame-duck session will be defined by the expected new power dynamics in Washington, with Democrats projected to win control of the House and potentially the Senate, too. If Democrats perform as expected, they will seek to leverage this electoral success into policy wins in this year’s appropriations legislation. However, this scenario also opens the possibility that this process could extend into the start of next year, when the new Congress is seated, as Democrats will be under pressure from their base not to settle.
• If the appropriations process extends into next year, it opens up the risk of a government shutdown starting in late December. Before last year’s government shutdowns, the longest shutdown followed the 2018 midterm elections, which saw Democrats flip the House and lose two seats in aggregate in the Senate. The shutdown lasted 35 days amid a standoff between President Trump and congressional Democrats. While a shutdown is far from guaranteed this year, Democrats appear poised for greater electoral success than in 2018 in this year’s midterm elections, which could again create the conditions for a shutdown if either party sees a political messaging opportunity in refusing to agree to an appropriations deal.

The Shape of a Deal. While uncertainty remains about when an FY27 appropriations deal may be reached, several contours of the likely deal itself have already emerged.

• The defense spending topline is expected to be around $1.15 trillion, the amount included in both chambers’ versions of the FY27 National Defense Authorization Act. What may change from those bills, though, is that funds may shift toward refilling the US’s dwindling munitions stock, as a bipartisan supplemental bill or a Republican-led reconciliation bill to address the issue separately is unlikely to pass.
• Given the expected shift in Democrats’ favor after the midterm elections, one of their biggest asks in striking an appropriations deal will be an increase in real terms for nondefense funding. While this increase may not match the roughly 37% increase anticipated in discretionary defense spending, Democrats will still push for a significant bump in discretionary nondefense appropriations. How that funding is allocated across programs remains to be determined. Democrats will acknowledge the risk that the White House may impound some of these appropriated funds, but they nevertheless believe that full-year appropriations bills provide a stronger basis for challenging these decisions in court than continuing resolutions do.
• With the US expected to hit its current debt limit sometime in the first half of next year, the White House may look to fold debt-limit extension negotiations through the end of Trump’s term into the appropriations package. While this will not be necessary from a timing perspective, congressional Democrats and Trump may both prefer to do so to avoid negotiating a second major bill after completing the appropriations process. Trump has also shown little desire to become a fiscal hawk and leverage the debt ceiling to restrain spending.

Share

Share this...

Facebook

Pinterest

Twitter

Linkedin